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The Policy Paper Series
The Robert Schuman Centre’s Policy Paper Series adds a further dimension to 
its existing publications, which included the Jean Monnet Chair Papers and the 
Working Papers. This series aims to disseminate the views of a person or a 
group on a particular policy matter, specifically in the field of European 
integration
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authors).
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The GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) is the EU’s sixth largest export market. 
The EU has an export surplus in the trade balance with the GCC and in 1999 EU 
exports to the GCC were twice the imports; EU exports amount to 29 billion 
Euro1. The EU exports are diversified, but the main share is covered by 
investment and intermediate goods such as railway locomotives and aircraft, 
electrical machinery and mechanical appliances. These product groups make up 
about one third of total exports. Medicaments and medical equipment make up 
another large part, leaving the remaining exports to a wide variety of products. 
Crude oil represents almost two thirds of EU imports from GCC.
This paper deals with EU - GCC trade relations and seeks to identify the 
interests at stake for both sides with regard to the accession of Saudi Arabia to 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as the possible establishment of a 
EU- GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The first section provides an overview 
of current trade relations between the EU and GCC countries as well as Yemen, 
Iraq and Iran. The second analyses the perspective of Saudi Arabia’ s accession 
to the WTO and looks at sensitive controversial issues still pending. A brief 
section is also dedicated to the Iranian application to the WTO. The third section 
explores the degree of GCC regional integration and looks at GCC-EU 
negotiations to establish a Free Trade Agreement. Finally, the last section draws 
some policy suggestions on EU strategy vis-à-vis the GCC countries and Iran.
European Commission (2001), “EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 





























































































2. a EU- GCC relations
In 1989 the EC and the GCC concluded a Co-operation Agreement, whose 
objective was to facilitate trade relations and market access and more generally 
to strengthen stability in the region. The 1989 Co-operation Agreement also 
committed the parties to enter into negotiations on a FT A. In 1991 the Council 
of the EU adopted a negotiating mandate where the establishment of a GCC 
Customs Union was a precondition to enter into a FTA with the GCC countries. 
On 16th of July 2001 the Council approved a new mandate, replacing the 1991 
mandate.
Why a new mandate? The new impetus might depend on the most recent 
figures concerning trade exchanges. Despite the Co-operation Agreement, GCC- 
EU trade relations had not significantly grown from 1987 to 1996 for some of 
the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait), while for others, they had declined 
dramatically (Oman, Qatar, Bahrain). In the year 2001 trade exchanges 
accounted for 51 billion Euro, thus 14.1 billion more than in 1999 (37 billion 
Euro). Such growth was entirely due to the significant increase of the oil price, 
rather than to a change in volumes exchanged. However, the result was 
increased attention to the strategic and economic importance of the region, and 
might have played a major role in EU Member States’ will to intensify talks and 
approve the new mandate.
In November 1999, at the annual GCC summit, the GCC countries decided 
on a GCC Customs Union that would enter into force in 2005. A new decision, 
which was formalised by the GCC Summit on December 31, 2001, sets January
1, 2003 as deadline. A formula for a Common External Tariff with a uniform 
tariff of 5% was also agreed.
2. b Non-GCC countries2
EU-Yemen relations have been formalised in a Development Co-operation 
Agreement in 1984, extended on March 1995 to cover the entire territory of 
Yemen. An advanced framework co-operation agreement on commercial, 
development and economic co-operation was signed on November 1997, 
replacing the 1984 Agreement. The new agreement entered into force on July 
1998. In absolute values, EU exports to Yemen are around six times EU imports. 
On average, over the last 4 years, exports were 600 million Euro per year and
2 Figures in the following paragraph are based upon the EIU viewswire's 



























































































imports 100 million Euro per year. EU imports are dominated by mineral oil 
products (70-80%) and the remaining items are mostly live animals, and raw 
hides and skins. EU exports to Yemen are more diversified with seven product 
groups making up 80% of the commodities. In the overall context, the EU- 
Yemen trade is making up 15-20% of the total Yemeni trade volume.
Iraq and the EU have no contractual relations and there is no official 
dialogue between the European Commission (EC) and the Iraqi Government. 
Trade flows were virtually non-existent from 1991 to 1996. In 1997 the amount 
of trade rose after the start of the oil-for-food programme. In 1999 the EU 
imports (99% oil products) from Iraq amounted to 3.68 billion Euro. The EU 
makes up more than a third of the Iraqi export destination markets. EU exports 
to Iraq are diversified, with large machinery and electrical and mechanical 
appliances making-up one third of total exports. Medicaments, medical 
equipment and food supplies make up another large part.
Although with Iran there are no contractual relations either, EU-Iran 
relations deserve closer attention. An EU-Iran Working Group on Trade and 
Investment has been established in November 2000 to discuss possibilities to 
increase and diversify trade and investments. As established by the EU Council 
of Ministers, this Working Group should lead to the negotiations of a Trade and 
Co-operation Agreement. The EU is Iran’s main trading partner for both imports 
(around 40%) and exports (around 36%). In 1999 EU imports from Iran reached 
4.7 billion Euro, while EU exports to Iran were 3.9 billion Euro. More than 75% 
of EU imports from Iran consist of oil products; EU exports to Iran are much 
more diversified, with power generation plants, large machinery and electrical 
and mechanical appliances making-up about 45 percent of the total.
3. WTO: Saudi Arabia’s accession process
3.a Saudi Arabia
Five out of six GCC countries are WTO members: Bahrain and Kuwait since its 
establishment (1 January 1995), Qatar since January 1996, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) since April 1996 and Oman since November 2000. Saudi 
Arabia applied to join the WTO in 1996. Saudi Arabia has many allies within 
the organisation (Canada, Japan, Australia), eager to see it on board. Accession 
to the WTO is an important priority for Saudi Arabia. However, given the 
number of outstanding issues to be addressed and the caution with which the 
government usually advances on economic issues, accession might take some 
time, probably as late as 20043 (EIU).
3 EIU viewswire (2001), “Accession to the WTO will take time”, Country 




























































































However, Commissioner Lamy’s visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2001 was 
very fruitful, since all the key issues were eventually put on the table. It was the 
end of a long effort to make Saudi negotiators understand that accession to 
WTO required serious negotiations. Until 1999, Saudi authorities looked at 
accession as something merely political, an unquestionable right, similar to the 
accession to United Nations. Now that issues are on the table and talks look at 
the heart of the problems, Saudi accession could be a question of time, although 
during recent months the accession process has been slowed down by the 
preparation of the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference.
Accession to the WTO will require Saudi Arabia to implement all the WTO 
rules that resulted from the Marrakech Agreement and to consolidate meaningful 
market access commitments for goods and services. WTO membership requires 
cutting subsidies, reducing export duties, protecting intellectual property rights 
and opening up the services sector, including insurance, to foreign competition. 
Until July 2001, Saudi Arabia still carried 12% duty on 90% of imports (now 
lowered to 5% duty), with 20% duty on sensitive manufactured imports.
3.b EU concerns:
• “Dual pricing”: petroleum products are sold in Saudi Arabia at administered 
prices generally significantly lower than international prices. For LPGs, 
which are important as petrochemical feedstock, domestic producer -  
including joint ventures between SABIC and foreign partners, enjoy a 30% 
discount over export prices. This practice enables Saudi Arabia to use its 
natural resources to promote industrialisation. Apart from dual pricing, other 
mechanisms to keep domestic prices lower than world prices risk being 
inconsistent with WTO rules. These mechanisms are export restrictions and 
export duties or taxes. European petrochemical producers claim that the 
Saudi petrochemical industry is subsidised, in particular the provision of 
below-market feedstock is a target for antidumping measures.
• Services: the key issue is the liberalisation of the telecommunications and 
distribution sectors. The Saudi negative list includes at the moment 
telecommunications, financial distribution services. Therefore such a 
negative list is currently the river to bridge to finalise the negotiations on 
Saudi accession. As for telecommunications, Saudi Arabia asks for long 
transition periods, whereas for the distribution sector, Saudi Arabia refuses a 






























































































official reason is the risk of unemployment, but there are significant and 
diversified private sector interests, which might be negatively affected by the 
liberalisation of distribution.
• Investment: Saudi Arabia has recently modified its investment rules. Foreign 
investors were required to partner with local distributors who were the only 
legal representatives of the company in the Kingdom. Saudi nationals should 
control or own 51 percent of enterprises. The reform has modified these 
investment rules, but a few difficulties still remain in sensitive sectors.
• Government Procurement: Saudi Arabia's public tendering system fails to 
meet WTO discipline in terms of national treatment and transparency, among 
other areas. Regionally based GCC generic manufacturers can and do 
participate in public sector tenders. In addition, the system discriminates in 
favour of local or regional (GCC) companies, providing both faster 
registration and preferential pricing (a 10 percent advantage in tenders as 
compared to multinational companies).
• Intellectual Property Rights: trademarks and copyrights are frequently 
violated.
• Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures: certificates are quite difficult and expensive to be obtained. In 
particular, specific rules on food products hinders the access of EU products 
(i.e. products must have half of their shelf-life ahead to enter)
• 3.c Saudi Arabia’s interests:
• WTO membership would give its petrochemical industry (the kingdom 
produces 5% of world petrochemical needs) access to wider international 
markets.
• It would give Saudi Arabia a forum where it can press for more favourable 
tariffs on its products and eventually the removal of energy taxes, seen as 
discriminatory.
• It would recognise Saudi Arabia as a trading country where the government 
is diversifying its oil-dependent economy, providing access to the global 




























































































• It would help the process of modernisation, especially if Saudi Arabia will be 
entitled to benefit from WTO capacity building programmes. This will be 
possible if it will join, as it would like to do, as developing country member.
• Saudi Arabia is interested in joining while keeping a gradual pace of reform 
and opening of its market. But Saudi Arabia is not ready to leave its infant 
industries without any protection. The example of Egypt, as described by Al- 
Sahlawi, proves that a fast liberalisation and privatisation process may lead 
an unprepared economy to sluggish performances. In this respect, however, 
the EC argues that these infant industries do not exist yet, since they should 
develop as a consequence of the ongoing diversification of Saudi economy. 
Of course it becomes difficult for the EC to accept exceptions for industries 
which do not exist yet, although, as we suggest in the final paragraph, a 
degree of flexibility on the EC side is to be welcomed with regard to this 
issue.
3 d  Obstacles to Saudi Arabia’s accession to WTO:
• The Saudi interpretation of the Shar’ia is incompatible with WTO provisions 
and can be the hardest obstacle to Saudi accession. It causes problems with 
regard to the insurance and the financial sector and the movement of 
workers. However, such problems can be sorted out. The insurance and the 
financial cases are difficult, since insurance is considered to be against the 
Shar’ia by Saudi traditionalists. However, neither financial nor insurance 
issues threaten to break down negotiations, since, as a matter of fact, 
financial services and banks already exist in Saudi Arabia. As for the banking 
sector, some Saudi business representatives and officials would even 
welcome some rules, since the real issue in some cases is that no clear rules 
are in place. Negotiations might contribute to filling up a juridical vacuum. 
Actually, the challenge of the negotiating process consists on drawing a 
distinction between real religious impediments, to be accepted as such, and 
disguised interests defended under the pretext of religion. For instance, Saudi 
Arabia will probably not make any concessions for audiovisuals because of 
religious concerns, and the OECD countries should not insist on this point, 
and accept the exception.
• Services: services negotiations are the most important issue. Without 
granting significant access in the telecommunications sector (currently 
owned by the State), negotiations will not go very far. Some informal 
attempts to attract foreign investors in telecommunications have failed 
because the investment is not seen as sufficiently remunerative. This is due to 
the conditions imposed by the Saudi government as well as to the non- 




























































































respect to the distribution sector, WTO Members cannot access to the market 
with the leasing and franchising formula.
• Manipulation of oil price angers the US, who have argued that memberships 
in OPEC is incompatible with membership in the free-trade-promoting WTO.
• The boycott on Israel might complicate or delay Saudi membership. It is seen 
as an impediment especially in the eyes of some US legislators.
• Price control system: for assessing import tariffs in place of a market-based 
system encouraging greater competition, Saudi Arabia uses a very simplistic 
and burdensome reference price system. The practice is discriminatory and 
protectionist in that no similar reference pricing system is applied to locally 
produced generic products.
3.fThe case o f Iran
Iran first applied to join the WTO in September 1996 but the application was 
blocked by the US and other western countries, which accused Teheran to back 
international terrorism. European governments then softened their position after 
Khatami was elected in 1997 and Iran renewed the application in 1998. Iran’s 
accession to the New York Convention on international arbitration, the proposed 
law on foreign investment procedures which provides more favourable terms, 
for foreign investors, some first steps towards the establishment of the first 
privately-owned banks in Iran since 1979: these are all signals of Iranian serious 
aspiration to join the WTO. On Februaty 2001 the US declared that they were 
reviewing their positions. After 5 years, on February 2001, the issue of Iranian 
accession was brought before the WTO General Council.
An economic reform aimed at diversifying the Iranian economy and 
strengthening non oil-sectors is ongoing. Iran would offer a huge market to 
enter, with great opportunities for the service sectors, intra-industry trade and 
exports of machinery and electrical appliances. However, Iran, notwithstanding 
its recent efforts towards reform and modernisation is still a rather marginalised 
economy and Iranian political features make it difficult to imagine a positive 
evolution of negotiations in Geneva in the coming years. However, the 11th of 
September events might play an important role in the development of relations 





























































































4. EU-GCC Free Trade Area
4. a Background
On the 16th of July last, a new mandate replacing that of 1991 mandate has been 
approved. While the 1991 mandate was mainly focused on goods, the current 
mandate includes liberalisation of trade in goods and services, intellectual, 
industrial and commercial property, public procurement, customs co-operation 
and competition.
No target date has been set for the FTA. The precondition, however, is the 
establishment on a GCC Customs Union. The GCC Summit of December 2001 
in Muscat decided to bring forward the creation of a Customs Union to January 
1, 2003, and to adopt a single import tariff rate at 5%, dramatically speeding up 
a process which had been making very slow progress.
At the same meeting the GCC countries also decided to establish a 
monetary union by 2010. However, as of the third quarter of 2000 intra-Gulf 
trade accounted for only 7% of the GCC’s total exports. Such recent 
developments are very encouraging for the EU’s efforts to strengthen GCC 
regional integration.
The former mandate identified three key sensitive categories of goods: 
aluminium, petrochemicals and chemicals. The new mandate does not list 
sensitive products and the reason is twofold. Firstly, the situation has changed 
with 5 countries out of the six members of the GCC joining the WTO and thus 
liberalising their economies. Secondly, the objective of the negotiators is to 
achieve a package deal, supposedly easier to agree. However, aluminium and 
petrochemicals still remain difficult outstanding issues.
4.b EU interests:
• EU exports are on average subject to higher tariffs than imports from GCC 
countries (79 % of which enter the EU duty free). In this case the main 
problem comes from the GCC countries’ fiscal policy. GCC countries have 
neither a TVA nor a personal income tax, thus customs duties are important 
for governmental revenue.
• EU exports of large machinery, electrical and mechanical appliances face 
high tariff (up to 20% in Saudi Arabia).





























































































• On the GCC side there are complaints about EU tariffs on petrochemicals 
and the very high tax on petroleum products that discourages oil 
consumption. The petrochemical issue has also come up in Saudi Arabia’s 
negotiations to join the WTO, but both the EU and the US justify their tariffs 
as the local producers receive subsidies by way of low-cost feedstock.
• The 6 % tariff that the EU imposed on aluminium imports from Dubai and 
Bahrain has also been a matter for controversy. In November 1999 the GCC 
side proposed the suspension of the tariff, but the EU did not take any action, 
although Britain was in favour, France objected and Germany, Spain and 
Greece abstained.
• As for Oman, the main complaint concerns high EU duties on fishery.
The eventual signing of the FT A is not actually a real issue. There are few 
obstacles that negotiations should overcome. The European Commission might 
eventually agree on the elimination of all industrial tariffs, and even on 
agriculture is ready to go far. Both sides have no strong interests defend in the 
agriculture sector, although the Commission will not completely open the sector 
for political reasons, namely the necessity not to set a dangerous precedent at the 
international level.
5. Policy Suggestions
• The new impetus towards concluding a FTA is to be welcomed. It is 
undeniable that an agreement will be a stabilisation factor in the area and the 
latest events cannot but stress the importance of such a strategic goal. From 
an economic point of view, the EU can profit from an emerging and 
diversifying market, destined to become more and more important in the 
coming years. The modernisation and diversification of the GCC countries’ 
markets will also determine diversified trade exchanges, increasingly 
investment and trade opportunities. Moreover, EU and GCC economies 
present interesting complementarities such as the increasing GCC need for 
agricultural products, the structural EU overproduction of agricultural 
unprocessed and processed foodstuffs.
• In order to achieve the FTA, the EU must continue encouraging GCC 
regional integration that will reduce differences in tariffs and regulations 
among the GCC countries and create just one interlocutor, thus facilitating 




























































































abstract commitments, since the GCC countries are somewhere in between, 
being six different entities and a unique trade counterpart.
• On sensitive issues, having negotiations started just now, it is very hard to 
forecast possible results or to draw policy suggestions. However, the EU 
should try and reach a package deal, as they are actually envisaging. A 
package deal, allowing mutual concessions, might lead to a substantial 
lowering of EU tariffs on aluminium and petrochemical products, while 
achieving increased market access for machinery, and more in general for EU 
services exports: the services market is expected to provide great 
opportunities as a consequence of the progressive diversification of GCC 
economies.
• Aluminium and petrochemicals actually deserve particular attention. As for 
aluminium, a serious assessment of the reality of dumping in the sector is 
needed. These dumping cases are unilaterally denounced by the EU, while 
the GCC countries claim that it is just a question of fair and lower production 
costs and that the real problem is the crisis of the aluminium sector in 
Europe. In this respect, it is worth noting that the EU countries objecting to 
or abstaining on the possible suspension of the EU 6% tariffs are the 
countries directing facing major difficulties in the sector itself (France, 
Germany, Spain, Greece). With regard to petrochemicals, it is true that the 
pricing system in the sector is quite clumsy, but it is also undeniable that 
GCC countries are highly competitive. Therefore the sooner the EU comes to 
the conclusion that the position will be hardly defendable in the long run, the 
better it will be for the negotiations and the bilateral relations in general, but 
also in terms of European domestic industrial strategy.
• Further reflection is needed with respect to the EU industrial policy vis-à-vis 
the GCC countries. On one hand, as we have just pointed out, the EU 
protectionist stand in specific sectors, such as petrochemicals and aluminium, 
does not pay off in the long run. On the other hand, GCC countries claim 
protection for their infant industries, which actually do not exist yet. 
Nonetheless this does not mean that GCC countries should necessarily 
renounce those structural conditions that might trigger their development. 
Nor should the EU give such a message, by frustrating the importance of 
industrial development to GCC countries. Therefore, we propose that the 
FT A be based on a more articulated approach.
• The traditional pattern of FTAs is based on inter-sector trade, namely on the 
exchange of raw materials against EU manufactured and investment products 
and services. In fact a FTA enhancing intra-industry integration, both 




























































































would help overcome the mutual protectionist tendencies and establish more 
solid and strategically wiser industrial integration.
• Moreover, European industry now seems to be keen to abandon its traditional 
geographical concentration of economic activity, since it is attracted by the 
factor cost advantages that third countries offer.
• It is crucial that the EU should link the EU-GCC FTA process to the WTO 
framework, in particular to Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO. Firstly, 
there is no doubt that the GCC countries that have already joined the WTO 
(such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and UAE) have now a relatively open economy 
when compared to Saudi Arabia. When joining the WTO, Saudi Arabia will 
be forced to open its economy. It is already doing so, with dramatic ongoing 
changes, aimed at diversifying the economy, attracting foreign capital, 
increasing non-oil exports. Secondly, many issues, such as subsidies to the 
petrochemical industry or Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection are 
common to all GCC countries and need a solution both at the WTO and the 
EU-GGC level.
• Such a process of modernisation and opening-up provides an opportunity not 
to be missed. The EU must play a strategic role in the integration process of 
the GCC countries. With respect to Saudi Arabia, its accession to the WTO is 
already supported by the other major economic powers. The EU should not 
leave them the possibility to build a preferential relationship and should 
actively support Saudi Arabia at the multilateral level. Moreover, it is better 
to work with Saudi Arabia while having it as a member of WTO. Signing the 
WTO treaty, from the Saudi perspective, makes the whole process of 
consensus building more streamlined.
• The Iranian situation is a peculiar one. The EU has good trade relations with 
Iran in terms of trade flows and would benefit significantly from a 
liberalisation process. Although the geopolitical importance of Iran and EU 
Member States’ growing interests in the country, Iranian accession is still far 
to come. Iranian reaction to the terrorist attacks and the US-UK military 
action in Afghanistan is likely to worsen relations with Western countries. 
However, in the long run it is desirable to establish more solid trade relations, 
not only for the huge opportunities that the Iranian market might provide for 
EU business, but also for avoiding isolating such a strategically important 
actor in the region.
Marco Chimllo, Eurochambres, Brussels





























































































APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
EC: European Commission
FTA: Free Trade Agreement
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
SPS: Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures
TLC: telecommunication
TBT: Technical Barriers to Trade
UAE: United Arab Emirates
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